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Recent Decisions
CONTRACTS: AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE: Ex PARTE PROCEEDINGS. Brink v.
Allegro Builders, Inc. (Cal. 1962).
A common arbitration provision states that each party to the agreement selects an
arbitrator and the arbitrators in turn select a third; should either party fail to appoint an
arbitrator, the one arbitrator selected may be authorized to act as the sole arbitrator or,
in the alternative, appoint the remaining arbitrators. Such provisions were of little effect
at common law, however, since agreements to submit controversies to arbitration could
be revoked at any time before an award was made.' A different result appears to be
required in those jurisdictions having statutes making agreements to arbitrate binding
and irrevocable.
In Brink v. Allegro Builders, Inc.,2 such a provision was held to be enforceable. Al-
though the 1961 revisions3 to the Code of Civil Procedure were not applicable to the
case in question, the same result would appear to be required in any case arising under
the present law, which states that agreements to arbitrate existing or future controversies
are "valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revoca-
tion of any contract." 4
In Brink the plaintiffs engaged the defendant to erect a house on a lot owned by them.
Clause 26 of the written contract provided that plaintiffs were to be responsible for
necessary grading; however, grading work was done by a third person, allegedly chosen
by defendant, and plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to repayment of the cost
of grading and compensation for the damages incurred. ,
The defendant, upon being notified of plaintiffs' demand, took the initiative and made
a written request for arbitration of plaintiffs' claims. After consulting with an attorney,
who advised that it had no responsibility under Clause 26, defendant informed plaintiffs
by telephone of its intention to rescind its demand for arbitration. A confirming letter
was also sent.
Plaintiffs, in a letter to defendant, stated that they had been informed of defendant's
intention to rescind but since the confirming letter had not yet arrived, they were
appointing an arbitrator.
Four days later plaintiffs informed defendant that they were proceeding to arbitra-
tion unilaterally as provided in the contract. 5 The ex parte arbitration was held before the
arbitrator chosen by plaintiffs. Defendant did not select an arbitrator, but did appear
and present evidence at the hearings before plaintiffs' arbitrator, after making it clear
that it did not intend to waive its objection that the dispute was not within the arbitration
clause. The arbitrator made an award in favor of plaintiffs, but the superior court denied
confirmation and granted defendant's motion to vacate the award.
The supreme court reversed the order and held that when a contract expressly per-
mits one arbitrator to proceed, the party not in default is not compelled to seek court aid
in invoking the arbitration clause. 6 The statutory procedure 7 to enforce an agreement
'Calif. Academy of Sciences v. Fletcher, 99 Cal. 207, 33 Pac. 855 (1893).
2 58 A.C. 589, 375 P.2d 436, 25 Cal.Rptr. 556 (1962).
a Stats. 1961, c. 461, p. 1540-50, § 2.
' CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. § 1281.
1 Clause 15 of the contract read in part: "In case of disputes either party may make a demand for
arbitration by filing such demand in writing with the other. One arbitrator may be agreed upon, other-
wise there shall be three, one named in writing by each party . . . and a third chosen by the two
appointed. Should either party refuse or neglect to appoint said arbitrator . . . he or they are em-
powered by both parties to proceed ex parte." Brink v. Allegro Builders, Inc., 58 A.C. 589, 591, 375
P.2d 436, 438 25 Cal.Rptr. 556, 558 (1962).
'A similar result was reached in Kentucky River Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111, 47 A.L.R.2d
1331 (6th Cir. 1953), decided under the provisions of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§ 1-14. This case concerned a contract for the shipment of goods in interstate commerce.
'CAL. CODE CIv. Pnoc. § 1281.2.
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to arbitrate by means of a court order was designed to afford a remedy where the con-
tract did not provide for a procedure to follow upon the refusal of either party to
arbitrate or where the contractual scheme has failed; it has no application where the
parties have expressly provided for such contingency.
The decision poses serious problems to the party who does not desire to arbitrate.
Must he arbitrate disputes which have no substantive merit? Must he arbitrate disputes
concerning matters which he believes are not within the scope of the arbitration agree-
ment? Must he arbitrate when he believes an enforceable contract does not exist?
Section 1281.2 permits a party to an arbitration agreement to petition the court for
an order compelling the parties to arbitrate; the order shall issue if. the court determines
that an agreement to arbitrate exists, the petitioner has not waived his right to compel
arbitration, and grounds do not exist for the revocation of the agreement. The section
also provides: "If a court determines that a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy
exists, an order to arbitrate may not be refused on the grounds that the petitioner's con-
tentions lack substantive merit."
Since the effect of Brink is to permit the parties to a contract to provide by express
terms an effective means for the enforcement of arbitration provisions as a substitute for
section .1281.2, it would appear that a party to a contract containing a provision similar
to that in Brink could not object on the grounds that the claim lacked substantive merit.
In view of the court's expressed policy in favor of arbitration,
8 it would seem to follow
that claims without substantive merit should be handled without resort to judicial
process.
A more serious question arises when the party objects to arbitration on the grounds
that the dispute was not within the arbitration clause. The contract in Brink specifically
stated that grading was the responsibility of the plaintiffs.
9 The arbitration clause was
particularly broad however: "As between the parties hereto, all questions as to the rights
and obligations arising under the terms of the contract, the plans, and specifications are
subject to arbitration." 10
The court did not consider the defendant's specific objection, indicating that where
the scope of subject matter is broad, the parties should endeavor to solve all problems
concerning the contract by arbitration.'
The district court of appeals had held that the ex parte arbitration without first
resorting to a petition to the court for an order directing arbitration 
was invalid.' 2
Among the reasons listed in adopting its view this court said:
[Plermitting an ex parte arbitration, even where the resisting party in good faith
has raised questions concerning either the existence of a valid contract or whether
an arbitrable issue has been presented, is extremely burdensome and unfair to
such resisting party. It compels such party to go through the arbitration pro-
cedure, including the hearing and introduction of evidence, before there has been
any judicial determination that a valid contract is in force or that an arbitrable
contract exists. 18
8 Franklin v. Nat. C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal.2d 628, 204 P.2d 37 (1949).
9 Clause 26 of the contract reads, in part: "The following specified items are the sole responsibility
of the Owner, and all charges or costs incurred shall be paid by the Owner over and 
above the contract
price. (a) Grading of lot." Brink v. Allegro Builders, Inc., 58 A.C. 589, 590, 375 P.2d 436, 437, 25
Cal.Rptr. 556, 557 (1962).
10 Brink v. Allegro Builders, Inc., 58 A.C. 588, 591, 375 P.2d 436, 438, 25 Cal.Rptr. 556, 558
(1962).
11 See Food Handlers Local 425 v. Pluss Poultry, Inc., 260 F.2d 835 (8th Cir. 1958). "Mere
assertion of non-arbitrability by one of the parties would not make it necessary for the other to petition
for a court order to proceed, provided for in Section 4 of the United States Arbitration Act. Questions
as to the arbitrability of such disputes are initially for the arbitrators and if they reach a wrong con-
clusion in that regard it is subject to correction by the court." Id. at 838. The case concerned a labor
arbitration agreement.
12 Brink v. Allegro Builders, Inc., 21 Cal.Rptr. 438 (Cal.App. 1962), rev'd, 58 A.C. 589, 375
P.2d 436, 25 Cal.Rptr. 556 (1962).
11 Id. at 443.
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The supreme court considered the scope of arbitration provisions in Posner v. Grun-
wald-Marx Inc.,14 an action in which a labor union sought a court order to compel arbi-
tration. The employer objected to the issuance of the order on the grounds that the
subject of the dispute was not within the agreement. In considering the scope of arbi-
tration provisions in collective bargaining agreements, the court adopted the "federal
rule."15 This rule states that where the agreement provides for the arbitration of all
disputes pertaining to the meaning, interpretation and application of the collective
bargaining agreement and its provisions, any dispute as to the meaning, interpretation
and application of specific matter covered by the collective bargaining agreement is a
matter of arbitration. Doubts as to whether the arbitration clause applies are to be
resolved in favor of coverage. This is to be contrasted with the "Cutler-Hammer" doc-
trine that the mere assertion by a party of a meaning of a provision which is clearly
contrary to the plain meaning of the words cannot make an arbitrable issue. If the
meaning of the provision sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be
anything to arbitrate and the contract cannot be said to provide for arbitration. 16
The district court of appeals determined that by application of the federal rule as
stated in Posner (even though the agreement before it was not a collective bargaining
agreement) the responsibility for the grading of the Brinks' lot may possibly have been
an arbitrable issue. Whether the Posner rule should be applied to a non-collective bar-
gaining agreement is questionable in view of the supreme court's statement that "the
'Cutler-Hammer' doctrine is based on a strict and technical application of ordinary con-
tract law while the rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court properly takes
into consideration the peculiar nature of the collective bargaining agreement."' 7 The
arbitration agreement in Brink was very general,' 8 however, and could be construed as
an agreement to arbitrate disputes as to what is a matter for arbitration.
It appears that the employer in Posner initially proceeded to arbitrate the dispute
and then withdrew. The supreme court stated that the action of the employer "in first
proceeding to arbitrate is some evidence in support of the inference that it intended the
[dispute] to be arbitrable."'19 This should be compared with the defendant's action in
Brink; defendant initially sought arbitration, withdrew, and finally appeared before the
sole arbitrator and presented evidence after specific objection. The district court of
appeals stated, "[Defendant] raised objections to the validity of the proceedings on this
matter. The fact that the hearing took over six hours and both sides presented evidence
could not be construed as a waiver of any of [defendant's] rights."29 Perhaps the de-
fendant's action in first seeking arbitration is evidence in support of the arbitrability of
the dispute, regardless of his objection at the time of the hearing.
The supreme court also disapproved of any statement in Drake v. Stein,21 contrary
to its decision in Brink. In Drake the applicants refused to appoint an arbitrator on the
grounds that they had rescinded the entire contract. Respondent proceeded to appoint
an arbitrator under a contract provision very similar to that in Brink and obtained an
award ex parte. The court held that the award should not be confirmed.
[A] claim that the contract is invalid or that it has been rescinded places the con-
troversy on the conscience of the court which must determine the equitable issues
"56 Cal.2d 169, 363 P.2d 313, 14 Cal!Rptr. 297 (1961).
15 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of America
v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
"Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc., 56 Cal.2d 169, 174, 363 P.2d 313, 315, 14 Cal.Rtpr. 297, 299
(1961).
27 Id. at 176, 363 P.2d at 316, 14 Cal.Rptr. at 301. (Emphasis supplied.)
's See text accompanying note 10 supra.
' Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc., 56 Cal.2d 169, 184, 363 P.2d 313, 321, 14 Cal.Rptr. 297, 305
(1961).
'o Brink v. Allegro Builders, Inc., 21 Cal.Rptr. 438, 441 (Cal.App. 1962).
21 116 Cal.App.2d 779, 254 P.2d 613 (1953).
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raised by the defendant. It is only after a finding has been made that under a
written contract of arbitration a party is in default in the performance thereof,
that the court will order the parties to the contract to proceed in accordance there-
with. Repudiation by one of the parties does not enable the other to proceed
without leave of the court .... [Tihe court below invaded the rights of appellants
by its approval of the arbiter's award before it had first determined under section
1282 . . . that a valid, enforceable contract did exist.22
Did the supreme court mean that a party must submit to arbitration even if there
is a good faith belief that a valid contract does not exist? This would appear to be an
extreme position, for section 1281 specifically excepts from enforceability contracts
where grounds exist for revocation. 2 3 To require arbitration of disputes arising under
unenforceable contracts would certainly be unfair. The New York courts have adopted
a position in agreement with that taken in Drake.2 4 The full implications of the disap-
proval of Drake must await further decision.
One important limitation upon the power of a single arbitrator to proceed ex parte
where the other party refuses or neglects to appoint an arbitrator was stated in Smith v.
Campbell and Facciolla, Inc.25 In interpreting an arbitration clause similar to that in
Brink, the court said the arbitrator could not proceed with a hearing without giving
notice to the respective parties. The court also reiterated that a waiver of a right to a
hearing will not be deemed to have been made in the absence of explicit language to
that effect.
In view of the foregoing, it would appear that a party to a contract providing for
ex parte arbitration upon the failure or refusal to appoint an arbitrator had best appoint
his own arbitrator rather than risk a one sided award. 26 If his only objection is lack of
substantive merit to a claim, there would seem to be no unfairness in requiring arbitra-
tion, for in most cases a determination favorable to the objecting party would result.
When faced with a demand for arbitration concerning subject matter beyond the scope
of the agreement, the reluctant party should not initially seek arbitration as was done in
Brink. If the claimant demands it, one approach would be to object specifically to the
arbitration of the dispute and to appoint an arbitrator for the sole purpose of determining
whether the matter is within the agreement. No evidence as to the merits of the con-
troversy should be given. If an affirmative determination is made, the reluctant party
should proceed to arbitrate the matter. Should a party believe that no valid contract
exists, he should specifically object to arbitration and have this issue determined; if a
finding is made that a contract exists, the matter should be submitted to further arbitra-
tion only after the specific objection is made again. If unfavorable results follow from
the arbitration the party then may seek relief in court by petitioning to have the award
vacated.2 7
Robert T. Owens
z2 Id. at 784, 254 P.2d at 617. (Emphasis supplied.)
21 CAL. CODE CIv. Pnoc. § 1281.
24 Bullard v. Morgan H. Grace Co., 240 N.Y. 388, 148 N.E. 559 (1925). "If a bona fide ques-
tion arises as to the proper construction of the submission agreement, a party may raise the question
by withdrawing from the arbitration. If the party aggrieved then desires to go on with the arbitration,
he must apply to the court, and the court will determine whether or not the withdrawing party was
in default in refusing to proceed to arbitrate a question covered by the submission agreement. Such
construction of the Arbitration Law prevents a party or the arbitrators from proceeding to arbitrate
and decide questions which the other party never agreed to submit to arbitration. Arbitration should
be encouraged, but arbitration tribunals may not determine for themselves, over the objection of a
party, to include within the scope of the arbitration questions which were never submitted to arbitra-
tion." 148 N.E. at 562.
25202 Cal.App.2d 134, 20 Cal.Rptr. 606 (1962).
20 See reason (2), Brink v. Allegro Builders, Inc., 21 Cal.Rptr. 438, 443 (Cal.App. 1962).
"7 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1285.
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SECURITY TRANSACTIONS: MORTGAGES: DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS. Roseleaf
Corp. v. Chierighino (Cal. 1963).
In Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino,1 the plaintiff sold a hotel and its furnishings to the
defendant, who.in return made a cash payment on a portion of the purchase price and
gave several notes covering the balance. One note was secured by a deed of trust on
the hotel and personal property situated therein. 2 The other notes were secured by
second deeds of trust covering certain property owned by the defendant. The latter
property was subsequently sold by the holders of the first trust deeds. Plaintiff's second
trust deeds were not protected at the sales and were thereby rendered valueless. De-
fendant defaulted in the payment of the notes, and the plaintiff brought this action to
recover the full amount owing on each. The trial court's judgment for the plaintiff was
upheld by the supreme court, which determined that recovery was not barred by the
antideficiency judgment statutes.3
In the intermediate appeal, 4 the district court of appeal had held that the action was
barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 580d,5 which prohibits deficiency judgments
where the foreclosure is under a power of sale as opposed to a judicial proceeding. That
the sale had been by someone other than the plaintiff was not considered material. The
court was relying on a previous statement of the supreme court concerning the anti-
deficiency judgment statutes where the high court had said, "These provisions indicate
a considered course of action on the part of the Legislature to limit strictly the right to
recover deficiency judgments, that is, to recover on the debt more than the value of the
security." 6
The supreme court, apparently recognizing that some confusion prevailed regarding
when the anti-deficiency judgment sections should apply,7 inquired into the purposes of
the statutes and arrived at some basic principles for their application.
Code of Civil Procedure sections 726 and 580a contain provisions, inter alia, that no
deficiency judgment shall be greater than the difference between the fair market value
of the property foreclosed upon and the amount owing on the debt. Such provisions "are
designed to prevent creditors from buying in at their own sales at deflated prices and
realizing double recoveries by holding debtors for large deficiencies." But this protection
is unnecessary in the case of sold-out junior lienors, because they are in no better
position to buy in at a low price than is the debtor himself. Therefore, the debtor should
bear the risk of a low foreclosure sale price, for he has provoked the senior sale. If this
were not so, the junior lienor might end up with neither the security nor a personal
cause of action. The court concludes that if a judgment is available at all, it will be for
the whole debt, not limited by the fair value provisions. 9
Whether a judgment may be had at all depends upon the applicability of' two
statutes, sections 580b and 580d of the Code of Civil Procedure. Contrary to the decision
of the district court of appeal, the supreme court held that section 580d does not govern
this case. That section by.its own terms applies "in any case in which the real property
1 59 A.C. 45, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal.Rptr. 873 (1963).
This note and trust deed were not here involved. It did not appear what became of the hotel.
CAL. CODE CIv. Paoc. § § 580a, 580b, 580d, 726.
Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 24 Cal.Rptr. 29 (Cal. App. 1962).
CAL. CODE CxV. Pnoc. § 580d: "No judgment shall be rendered for any deficiency upon a note
secured by a deed of trust or mortgage upon real property hereafter executed in any case in which the
real property has been sold by the mortgagee or trustee under power of sale contained in such a
mortgage or deed of trust." The remainder of the section sets out exceptions which are not material
here.
' Brown v. Jensen, 41 Cal.2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953), quoted by the court in Freedland v.
Greco, 45 Cal.2d 462, 289 P.2d 463 (1955).
' Cf. Riesenfeld, California Legislation Curbing Deficiency Judgments, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 705,
710 (1960).
I Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 A.C. 45, 50, 378 P.2d 97, 99, 27 Cal.Rptr. 873, 875 (1963).
9 Id. at 51, 378 P.2d at 99, 27 Cal.Rptr. at 875.
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has been sold by the mortgagee or trustee under power of sale contained in such
mortgage or deed of trust." The power exercised must be contained in the very instrument
securing the note sued upon. As the purpose of section 580d is to insure that the sale
will bring an adequate price, the legislature, reasoned the court, in order to equalize
the advantages of judicial and non-judicial foreclosures, could have imposed upon sales
under a power of sale either a right to redeem (which would insure an adequate sale
price by allowing the mortgagor to redeem at the price brought by the sale 10 ) or a denial
of deficiency judgments. It chose the latter. However, to deny a deficiency judgment
to a sold-out junior lienor would not accomplish the purpose of insuring an adequate sale
price, for the junior has nothing to do with the sale. Therefore, section 580d does not
apply."
As to section 580b, which bars deficiency judgments where the mortgage is for the
purchase price of realty, the court again looked to the legislative purpose to determine its
applicability. Originally, the basic obligation of any loan was the personal obligation of
the debtor, whether or not the debt was secured, so that a personal judgment was gen-
erally available to the extent the security did not cover the debt. During the Depression
it became obvious, however, that these judgments were unduly burdening the small
buyer. As a result, the legislature took steps to alleviate the hardships. 12 Among these
was the enactment of section 580b.13
A question soon arose as to how far this statute was to extend. From time to time it
was argued that an action brought because the security was totally exhausted did not fall
within the section, for the reason that the relief sought was not a "deficiency judgment."
Although this argument prevailed in Hillen v. Soule,14 it was expressly rejected by the
supreme court in Brown v. Jensen,'5 where the court said that a deficiency resulting
from a total depletion of the security is still a deficiency, and that section 580b shows a
legislative intent to strictly limit deficiency judgments. After the decision in Brown, it
appeared that in no case would a personal judgment be allowed where there had been
purchase money security in a sale of realty.16 However, with the appearance of the facts
in Roseleaf, where the equities weighed heavily in favor of the plaintiff, the court was
forced to re-examine the purpose of the statute.
Section 580b provides that in no event will a deficiency judgment be awarded where
the foreclosure sale was on a mortgage given to secure the purchase price of realty. The
court in Roseleaf finds that this section was drafted with the standard purchase money
mortgage in mind, where the buyer gives back a mortgage on the very property pur-
chased to secure payment of the price. When this standard is deviated from, the court
announces that it will look to the purpose of the section to determine its applicability
to the case. "Variations on the standard are subject to section 580b only if they come
within the purpose of that section."'17
Reviewing prior statements as to the purpose of section 580b and finding them inade-
quate,' 8 the court advanced two basic reasons for the statute.
10 For a discussion of how the right of redemption guarantees an adequate sale price, see Salsbery
v. Bitter, 48 Cal.2d 1, 11,306 P.2d 897 (1957).
11 Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 A.C. 45, 54, 378 P.2d 97, 99, 27 Cal.Rptr. 873, 875 (1963).
12 OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 975 (1951).
'a CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 580b: "No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of
real property for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or under a deed of trust, or
mortgage, given to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property.
"Where both a chattel mortgage and a deed of trust or mortgage have been given to secure pay-
ment of the balance of the combined purchase price of both real and personal property, no deficiency
judgment shall lie at any time under either one thereof."
14 7 Cal.App.2d 45, 45 P.2d 349 (1935).
15 41 Cal.2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953).
'o See Freedland v. Greco, 45 Cal.2d 462, 289 P.2d 463 (1955).
17 Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 A.C. 45, 51, 378 P.2d 97, 100, 27 Cal.Rptr. 873, 876
(1963).
10 Id. at 52, 378 P.2d at 101, 27 Cal.Rptr. at 877.
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First, by placing the risk of inadequate security on the mortgagee, vendors are dis-
couraged from overvaluing their security. "Precarious land promotion schemes are dis-
couraged, for the security value of the land gives purchasers a clue as to its true market
value."'19 If the vendor sells land for more than it is worth, and takes the normal propor-
tion as a down payment, he will have to settle for what the land is really worth when
he realizes upon his security. Similarly, when he takes an unduly small down payment,
he will be able to look only to the land for satisfaction of the balance. To avoid such a
risk, the vendor is forced to evaluate his security conservatively.
Second, if the deficiency results not from an overvaluation by the vendor, but from a
decline in the market value of the property, the statute tends to check the further eco-
nomic downturn that would result from imposing large personal liability on many pur-
chasers while simultaneously confiscating their land.
I Having arrived at the purpose of the statute, the supreme court applied it to the facts
and found that the two evils which the section was designed to prevent were not present.
"There is no indication in the present case that the hotel was overvalued. The purchaser
will not lose the property he purchased yet remain liable for the purchase price. To apply
section 580b here would mean that the Chierighinos would acquire the hotel at less than
the agreed price."
20
It will be observed from the foregoing statement that in applying the two policies to
the facts, the court seems to use two different approaches. With regard to the policy of
discouraging overvaluation, the court considered it sufficient to state that in the present
case there was no evidence of overvaluation. On the other hand, with regard to the
policy of checking depression, the court was not concerned with whether there was cur-
rently a declining real estate market. The court said only that in this case the purchaser
will not lose his property yet remain liable for the price. Apparently the thinking was that
any time a purchaser loses his purchase yet remains liable, the policy of section 580b
is thwarted, regardless of whether there is in fact a depression which ought to be
checked.
No doubt these divergent approaches can be justified, for in a given case the over-
valuation, if any, will have already taken place by the time it gets to court, while the
uncertainty of economic fluctuations does not lend itself to determining whether there
is in fact a current depression or recession. The point is, that on. the one hand the court
seems to be looking to whether the particular vendor should be prevented from profiting
by overvaluation, while, on the other hand, determining whether a deficiency judgment
is barred on the extremely broad basis of possible detriment to the economy. If this is
the basis upon which the court intends to apply the statute, the "anti-depression" aspect
of its purpose will encompass nearly every purchase money mortgage and the exceptions
to section 580b will be rare indeed. This is probably in keeping with the legislative
intent, and an examination of various situations will bear it out.
According to Roseleaf, the basic questions to be asked in each situation are whether
the security was overvalued and whether the purchaser will lose the property purchased
yet remain liable, for the purchase price. In the standard purchase money mortgage, the
answer to one of these questions will always be in the affirmative. The deficiency may or
may not result from overvaluation, but no matter why there is a deficiency, the purchaser
loses the property purchased, for that is what he mortgaged and a deficiency judgment
would leave him liable for the price. If the value of the security is lost because of fire
or other accident, or because of the intervention of a prior lienor, it seems the statute
will still apply, for in Brown it was held that a foreclosure sale is unnecessary if a sale
would be useless.
21
Where the property mortgaged is not the same as the property purchased, the secur-
ity may prove inadequate for a variety of reasons. If because it was overvalued, a
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Brown v. Jensen, 41 Cal.2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953).
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deficiency judgment is unavailable. If because of a decline in the market, the section
would seem to apply, even though the purchaser does not lose the property purchased,
for the policy of preventing depression would be served by barring judgment. If, how-
ever, the security is lost for any other reason, it would seem that the statute does not
apply, as in Roseleaf where the security was lost because of a sale by a prior lienor. It
would seem that the holding in Roseleaf would be followed if the security were lost by
fire or earthquake or other accident, for these situations are basically similar to that case.
The situation in each is twice removed from the standard purchase money mortgage:
first, the mortgage is on property other than that purchased by the vendee; and second,
the deficiency results from causes other than a foreclosure by purchase money mortgagee.
Thus it has been shown that where a mortgage or deed of trust is given to secure
the payment of the purchase price of realty, no personal judgment for the price may be
had against the purchaser unless two questions can be answered in the negative: was the
security overvalued; will the purchaser lose his purchase yet remain liable. A negative
answer requires two factors removing the case from the standard situation. First, the
mortgage must be on property other than that purchased, so that the purchaser will not
lose what he purchased. Second, the deficiency must result from some cause other than
a forecloseure by the vendor, for such a foreclosure could produce a deficiency only
because of overvaluation or a decline in the market. These factors must be present before
a purchase money mortgagee may recover a personal judgment for the price.
With these principles in mind, one more situation might be envisaged. Assume a
case similar to Roseleaf, where the property mortgaged was other than that purchased
and its security value lost by the intervention of a prior lienor, but where there is evi-
dence that the realty sold was in fact overvalued. Does section 580b provide a defense
to the vendor's action for the price? The court in Roseleaf said, "There is no indication
in the present case that the hotel was overvalued." 22 This statement might imply that if
it had been overvalued the section would be applicable. This illustrates that although the
factors mentioned above must be present for the vendor to prevail, they will be ineffectual
unless they negatively answer the basic questions: was the property overvalued; will
the purchaser lose the property he bought yet remain liable for the price.
Thomas A. Castelazo
TORTS: Conflicts: WA7RONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES: STATUTORY LIMITATIONS:
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. (2d Cir. 1962).
Since Lord Campbell's Act in 1846,1 the wrongful death action has provided one
of the most fertile fields for conflicts problems in the tort liability area. One of the most
recent examples is Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 2 where the New York Court of
Appeals reviewed an action brought by a New York resident against a Massachusetts
airlines to recover for the death of her husband, allegedly caused by the defendant's
negligence. The issue ostensibly before the court concerned the plaintiff's second cause
of action which sounded in contract, breach of a carrier's contract of safe carriage.8
This contract theory was undoubtedly formulated to avoid a $15,000 ceiling on death
case damages imposed by the Massachusetts wrongful death statute,4 the law of the
place where the injury causing death occurred. If the action were correctly characterized
21 See text accompanying note 20 supra for the full quotation.
I Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Viet., c. 93.
2 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
'Id. at 38, 172 N.E. at 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
4 Mass. Acts 1949, c. 427, § 2: "If the proprietor of a common carrier of passengers . . . by
reason of . . . its negligence . . . causes the death of a passenger . . .. it shall be liable in damages
in the sum of not less than two thousand nor more than fifteen thousand dollars, to be assessed with
reference to the degree of culpability of the defendant." The statute has since been amended on two
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as contractual, the New York court could, under its choice of law rules, 5 properly apply
forum law, which not only lacked any such statutory limitations6 but in fact had a con-
stitutional provision prohibiting recovery restrictions in wrongful death actions.
7 The
New York Court of Appeals, however, did not so characterize the plaintiff's case and
affirmed the appellate division's dismissal of the second, or contractual, cause of action.
8
Had the court stopped here, the Kilberg case would not have received the attention
which it has.9 However, the plaintiff had also stated a cause of action in tort based on
the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, apparently acquiescing in the traditional
choice of law rule that the lex loci delictus controlled the tort action, including the meas-
ure and extent of damages. 10 This problem was not in issue before the New York Court
of Appeals; it was neither argued by the parties nor raised or presented by the record."
Nevertheless, the majority of the court stated that the plaintiff could maintain her tort
action in the New York courts under the Massachusetts statute without regard to its
statutory limitations, and it granted her leave to amend her complaint accordingly if she
were so inclined. 12 In this dicta the New York court has been charged with holding
contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority and overturning numerous prior New
York decisions. 13 It is submitted, however, that the only real fault with the Kilberg dicta
is its semantic uncertainty.
Undoubtedly, the decision was based upon public policy grounds and the increasing
volume of interstate air travel. The New York public policy against death case recovery
limitations was "strong, clear and old," and the court felt that New York residents should
be protected against "unfair and anachronistic treatment of the lawsuits" resulting from
these air disasters.14 While still requiring the plaintiff to sue on the Massachusetts
statute, it would "refuse on public policy grounds to enforce one of its provisions as to
damages."15
It is equally undeniable, however, that the Kilberg court was also very much con-
cerned with the substance versus procedure approach to the same problem. After setting
out the commonly accepted rule regarding the application of the distinction, and finding
that, on the issue of whether the measure of damages was substantive or procedural,
there was authority both ways, the court concluded, "It is open to us, therefore, par-
ticularly in view of our own strong public policy as to death action damages, to treat
occasions. The first amendment raised the maximum recovery to $20,000. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 229,
§ 2 (Supp. 1961). In the second, Mass. Acts 1962, c. 306 (effective Jan. 1, 1963), the Massachusetts
legislature raised the minimum to $3,000 and the maximum limitation to $30,000. It also had before
it two bills which would have removed altogether the ceiling on death case damages. Both were
rejected. See Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 567 n.3 (2d Cir. 1962) (dissent),
cert. denied, U.S.L. Week 3261 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1963).
5 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 38, 172 N.E.2d 526, 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133,
135 (1961).
0 N.Y. DEC. ESTATES LAW § 130-32.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 16: "The right of action now existing to recover damages for injuries result-
ing in death, shall never be abrogated; and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statu-
tory limitation."
8 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 39, 172 N.E.2d 526, 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133,
135 (1961).
9 The Kilberg case has been exhaustively noted. See, e.g., Note, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 187 (1961);
Note, 74 HAIMr. L. REV. 1652 (1961).
10 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 39, 172 N.E.2d 256, 257, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133,
135 (1961).
"Id. at 43, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 138 (separate opinion of Fuld, J.).
"'Ibid. (majority opinion).
"Id. at 46, 172 N.E.2d at 532, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 143 (separate opinion of Froessel, J.).
14 Id. at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136. But cf. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New
York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (19f8) where Justice Cardozo, speaking for an earlier court, found
nothing in the Massachusetts statute that outraged the public policy of New York.
16 Ibid.
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the measure of damages in this case as being a procedural or remedial question con-
trolled by our own State policies."'16
Beyond this the Kilberg court did not expressly go. But its language and its selection
and handling of cases in support of its conclusion clearly indicates that substance-pro-
cedure considerations were uppermost in its mind.17
When the Kilberg decision was handed down, a similar case involving the same air-
plane crash was pending in the federal district court in New York. This was the subject
case of Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.'8 In Kilberg, Justice Froessel, in a separate
concurring opinion, agreed with the majority on the dismissal of the second cause of
action, but he vigorously dissented from the proposition propounded by the court on
the tort action.' 9 While not elaborating, he expressed "grave doubts" as to the constitu-
tionality of the Kilberg dicta in light of the full faith and credit clause and interpretative
law.20 In Pearson these doubts achieved fruition and the constitutional issues were
thoroughly litigated.
Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 21 and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manu-
facturing Co., Inc.,22 the federal district court was, of course, bound to apply New York
law, including her choice of law rules. Upon the authority of Kilberg, therefore, it ruled
that the plaintiff's cause of action was not subject to the Massachusetts limitations,
denied several motions by the defendant to fix damages at the $15,000 maximum, and
entered judgment on a verdict for approximately $134,000.23 The defendant appealed
15 Id. at 42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137. (Emphasis supplied.) The court cited
Walton School of Commerce v. Stroud, 248 Mich. 85, 226 N.W. 883 (1929). It also maintained that
there were no controlling New York authorities, although it relied very heavily on Wooden v. Western
N.Y. & Pa. R. Co., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050 (1891) where the following statement appeared:
"restriction pertains to the remedy, rather than the right . . .[and] does not strictly affect the rule of
damages, but rather the extent of damages; and that extent, as limited or unlimited, does not enter
into any definition of the right enforced, or the cause of action permitted to be prosecuted." Id. at 16,
26 N.E.. at 1051. The statement is in point but, ironically, the holding is not. In Wooden the New
York forum applied its own recovery limitations to a Pennsylvania wrongful death statute which had
none. The majority also relied somewhat on Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, 266 N.Y. 244,
194 N.E. 692 (1935).
17 It has been said, however, that this language may have been mere subterfuge, that it has since
been disregarded by the court itself, and Kilberg interpreted as an affirmation of a strong state public
policy. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 559 n.14 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 31
U.S.L. Week 3261 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1963). This conclusion would appear to be borne out by the subse-
quent case of Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962), where
the court refused to apply. the lex fori to the issue of prejudgment interest on damages in a wrongful
death action based on a Maryland statute. In Davenport the court said the measure of damages was
inseparably connected with the right of action-a matter or substance to be treated by the lex loci-
particularly in wrongful death cases. Id. at 393, 183 N.E.2d at 903, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 18. "Kilberg
... must be held merely to express this State's strong policy with respect to limitations in wrongful
death actions." Id. at 395, 183 N.E.2d at 904, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 19. The trouble with Davenport,
however, is that Chief Justice Desmond, author of the majority opinion in Kilberg, although concur-
ring in the result, stoutly maintained that the majority opinion here was "inconsistent with our stated
grounds for decision in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines." Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.) Moreover, it is in-
teresting to note that Justice Froessel, who so vigorously disagreed with the majority in his separate
opinion in Kilberg, dissented here because he thought "reason and logic" dictate that the court follow
its prior rule and apply it to interest as "an inseparable part of the damages." Id. at 396, 183 N.E.2d
at 905, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
18 199 F.Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y.), aflun'd, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
'9 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 46-51, 172 N.E.2d 526, 532-35, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133, 141-46 (1961) (separate opinion of Froessel, J.).
10 Id. at 51, 172 N.E.2d at 535, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
2' 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
22 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
1s Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 199 F.Supp. 539, 540 (S.D.N.Y.), affrn'd, 309 F.2d 553
(2d Cir. 1962). In affirming, however, the Second Circuit agreed with the panel decision (Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131 (1962)) that on the authority of Webb v. Davenport, 11
N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962), the prejudgment interest entered by the
district court must be stricken out.
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to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit where a majority of a panel
of three circuit judges held that the Kilberg dicta violated the full faith and credit clause
of the federal constitution.2 4 Judge Swan, writing for the panel majority, noted that
under Erie the federal district court was bound to apply New York law unless precluded
by some constitutional prohibition.2 5 Balancing the purpose and influence of the full
faith and credit clause against New York public policy, he concluded that the former
should prevail in this case, and it was, therefore, error for the trial court to apply the
Massachusetts statute without regard to its statutory limitations.26 Circuit Judge Irving
Kaufman entered a strong dissent upholding the trial court and the Kilberg rule.27
It is at this point that the waters become muddy, for, within a short time Pearson
was reheard by the Second Circuit en banc, and, in a 6-3 decision, the court reversed the
panel and affirmed the district court.28 Judge Kaufman, now writing for the majority on
the rehearing, went on to further elaborate the views set out in his earlier dissent.
In essence the Second Circuit's holding was that each state has the power to develop
its own conflicts of law doctrine and that the refusal of New York in Kilberg to honor the
Massachusetts limitations was not an unconstitutional exercise of that power. 29
The panel decision was criticized as exalting the lex loci delictus theory to constitu-
tional status and as barring New York from applying any of its own wrongful death
policy to the Massachusetts cause of action. 30 "If this is indeed the rationale of the panel's
opinion," Judge Kaufman ironically observed, "then it is the first decision to 'freeze' into
constitutional mandate a choice-of-law rule derived from what may be described as the
Ice Age of conflict of laws jurisprudence-at a time when that jurisprudence is in an
advanced stage of thaw."3' 1 Noting the apparent concession that New York had sufficient
ties in the transaction to justify the application of its own wrongful death law to the
case, he characterized the objectors as arguing that, although New York is not required to
give any faith or credit to the Massachusetts act, "once it gives Massachusetts law some
faith and credit it must also give it full faith and credit."3 2 But, he reasoned, the statutory
limitations on recovery in the Massachusetts statute are entitled to no more obeisance
than certain other statutory limitations,33 and the defendant has no "vested right" in the
application of the Massachusetts rule of liability for wrongful death.3 4
Finally, the opinion writer failed to find anything truly revolutionary or radical in
the Kilberg dicta: the New York court merely applied a traditional choice of law rule
which designated the Massachusetts law as the source of liability for the wrongful
death.35
It has absorbed the Massachusetts rule into the corpus of New York law for the
purposes of adjudicating this case fairly .... We believe that in so doing New
York is not bound to model all of the rules governing this litigation in which it is
conceded it has a legitimate interest, on Massachusetts law. We are convinced
that New York may examine each issue in the litigation-the conduct which
creates liability, the parties who may bring an action, the extent of liability, the
period during which the liability may be sued upon, and in appropriate cases,
matters of immunity, insurance procedure, etc.-and by weighing the contacts of
various states with the transaction, New York may, without interferring with the
24 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131, rev'd on rehearing, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.
1962).
25 Id. at 133.
20 Id. at 133-36.
27 Id. at 136-47 (dissent).
11 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 31 U.S.L. Week
3261 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1963).
29 Id. at 556.
10 Id. at 557.
81 Ibid.
" Ibid. (Emphasis by the court.)
33 Ibid.
34 Id. at 560-61.
" Id. at 560-62. See note 45 infra.
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Constitution, shape its rules controlling the litigation. . . We therefore see no
escape from the proposition we announce today, that a legitimately interested
state may, under the circumstances of this case, apply a firmly fixed and long
existing policy of its own, although this would remove a defense provided by an
'integral' provision of the locus' statute creating the cause of action.36
Although, very much in the manner of the New York Court of Appeals, the Second
Circuit does not expressly decide the case on the substance versus procedure approach,
again the language of the opinion, despite certain disclaimers, 3 7 and the selection and
handling of precedents leads inexorably to the conclusion that this consideration wa's in
large measure responsible for the decision.
Looking at the situation from another point of view, moreover, much, if not most, of
the criticism of the Kilberg dicta has been directed at its substantive-procedural implica-
tions. In fact, it appears to be the major argument of the dissenters on the rehearing that
Kilberg provides a wanton and arbitrary distinction between the substantive and pro-
cedural elements of a foreign-based cause of action, and that this is, in turn, proscribed
by the full faith and credit clause.38
Certiorari now having been denied by the United States Supreme Court,3 9 it remains
to speculate on the future of the Kilberg-Pearson rule. Seemingly, the denial signals a
victory for those advocates of a more flexible approach to choice of law issues in tort
cases. 40 In its present form, however, it is submitted that the rule is not a satisfactory
rule of law for conflicts purposes. It involves three separate elements: substantial con-
nection with the transaction, a "strong, clear and old" public policy, and, by implication
at the very least, some substantive-procedural distinction through which recovery limita-
tions can be divorced from the substantive elements of liability. The first element of
necessity brings into play problems of residence and domicile, which of themselves
present interesting variations. As interpreted and applied by the Second Circuit, the
Kilberg rule approaches what, for want of a better term, might be called a "proper law"
of torts in conflict cases. 41 There is some question whether that is a logical or desirable
development and, to borrow Judge Kaufman's metaphor, whether this is not melting a
pleistocene glacier a bit too rapidly than is in reality called for.
The present statement of the rule is cumbersome and may lead to precedential incon-
sistencies within each state and circuit. Contacts will vary from case to case and, in their
comparative weight, from court to court. Defining public policy on any particular issue
is always a highly sensitive and delicate task, bringing in political and social considera-
I' Ibid.
81 Id. at 559: "Our decision cannot, therefore, be interpreted to condone a forum's applying its
own rules in a wanton manner by labeling matters 'procedural' while arbitrarily choosing the parts of
a foreign statute it wishes to enforce by labeling them 'substantive.' We do hold, however, that a state
with substantial ties to a transaction in dispute has a legitimate constitutional interest in the applica-
tion of its own rules of law. If, indeed, those connections are wholly lacking or at best tenuous, then
it may be proper to conclude that the state has exceeded its constitutional power in applying its local
law.... But that is, ex hypothesi, not the case before us." But quaere.
88 Id. at 567-68 (dissent). See also Note, 74 HAnv. L. Rsv. 1652 (1961). Throughout the entire
litigation in both the Kilberg and Pearson cases, neither the proponents nor the opponents of the rule
have presented a united front. Judge Froessel objected to the interpretation of the Massachusetts
statute and felt the rule violated the overwhelming weight of authority. See text accompanying notes
19 and 20 supra. Judge Swan, writing for the Second Circuit panel majority, held the rule violative
of the full faith and credit clause by balancing New York public policy against the purpose and in-
fluence of the constitutional provision. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra. Judge Kaufman,
when dissenting from the panel decision, wrote, "the precise question which must be decided in this
case is whether New York has a 'sufficiently substantial contact' with the events surrounding the
action maintained by Mrs. Pearson for the death of her husband in this particular airplane crash."
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131, 142, rev'd on rehearing, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.
1962). In the principal case, however, he appears to adopt a substantial-contact-public-policy-pro-
cedural combination rationale. And as Webb shows, the New York Court of Appeals has not itself
been consistent in its justification of the rule. See note 17 supra.
" Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. Pearson, 31 U.S.L. Week 3261 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1963).
" See Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARv. L. REv. 881, 885-88 (1951).
" Ibid. Compare RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS, § § 332-32b (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
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tions as well as judicial. Only five states have constitutional prohibitions against death
damage restrictions similar to New York.42 On the other hand, Massachusetts is joined
by twelve other states having statutory limitations on wrongful death recoveries. 43 In
the other jurisdictions, there is probably only conjecture.
Moreover, the present justification of the rule is not entirely free from objection, for
no matter how the substantial connection theory is applied in such a case, the feeling is
inescapable that the forum is giving extraterritorial effect to its law in the true and notjust the conflicts sense. And any extension of the rule in its present form might lead to
some strained logic and reasoning, as, for example, where the public policy is contra or
less strong, or where a nonresident defendant or a corporation not doing business in the
forum state is involved.44 Nor does the combination remove the constitutional dangers
lurking in the background.
As both the Kilberg and Pearson decisions indicate, however, the rule can be upheld
on a substantive-procedural approach alone, and without considerations of public policy
or substantial contacts. As thus delimited, it would be a far more satisfactory rule, ad-
ministratively speaking at least. It would leave each court free to approach the problem
on a rational and logical basis without the necessity of making additional inquiries into
the contacts of the transaction, the extent and degree of its own public policy, or of the
domicile and residence of the parties. By so confining the rule it is submitted, it is less
vulnerable to attack and offers a far less novel solution to the problem.4 5 Furthermore, it
would be simpler, more workable, and would apply in a greater number and variety of
cases.
Richard J. Kohlman
See 4 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, Law Digests ("Action for Death") (1962): Arizona, Kentucky,
Ohio, Oklahoma and Utah.
41 Ibid. Illinois, Maine, Virginia ($30,000); Colorado, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hamp-
shire, West Virginia ($25,000); Wisconsin ($22,500 to $36,500); Oregon, South Dakota ($20,000).
44 See Note, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 187, 191-94 (1961).
45 Id. at 188-91: "In any event, the Kilberg decision clearly does not compel the trial court to
depart from the general rule that the elements are determined by application of the lex loci ...[J]udicial dissatisfaction with the lex loci rule indicates the Kilberg case is likely to be followed in
other jurisdictions .... The Kilberg court's assertion that the measure of damages is governed by the
lex fori because it is procedural and because the limitation of the lex loci is contrary to the public
policy of the forum could be made in any case involving a foreign limitation, regardless of the resi-dence of the parties." But cf. Wilson v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 210 Cal.App.2d 509, 26 Cal.Rptr.
626 (1962), where the plaintiff brought an action in California on a Texas wrongful death statute.
The foreign statute provided that actions by the beneficiaries must be brought within three months
of the death of the decedent, otherwise the exceutor or administrator was the proper party to bring
the action. The court found nothing contrary to the policy of California and applied the three months
limitation to the action, although it observed, inter alia, that the purpose of the limitation was to
"simplify and expedite matters." Id. at 511, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 628. Apparently the plaintiff relied on the
Texas general statutes of limitation to control the issue. It would seem that a strong substance versus
procedure argument could have been urged, but if presented, was not discussed in the opinion. Kilberg
or Pearson were not discussed. See also Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
1963]

